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Abstract
We consider a reinforcement learning framework where agents have
to navigate from start states to goal states. We prove convergence of
a cycle-detection learning algorithm on a class of tasks that we call re-
ducible. Reducible tasks have an acyclic solution. We also syntactically
characterize the form of the final policy. This characterization can be
used to precisely detect the convergence point in a simulation. Our result
demonstrates that even simple algorithms can be successful in learning a
large class of nontrivial tasks. In addition, our framework is elementary in
the sense that we only use basic concepts to formally prove convergence.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is the subfield of Artificial Intelligence concerned
with agents that have to learn a task-solving policy by exploring state-action
pairs and observing rewards (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Off-policy algorithms
such as Q-learning, or on-policy algorithms such as Sarsa, are well-understood
and can be shown to converge towards optimal policies under quite general
assumptions. These algorithms do so by updating, for every state-action pair
(s, a), an estimate Q(s, a) of the expected value of doing a in s.
Our aim in this article is expressly not to propose a more efficient or more
powerful new RL algorithm. In contrast, we want to show that convergence can
occur already with very simplistic algorithms. The setting of our result is that
of tasks where the agent has to reach a goal state in which a reward action can
be performed. Actions can be nondeterministic. We like to refer to this setting
as navigational learning.
The learning algorithm we consider is for a simplistic agent that can only
remember the states it has already visited. The algorithm is on-policy; its only
update rule is that, when a state is revisited, the policy is revised and updated
with an arbitrary new action for that state. We refer to this algorithm as the
cycle-detection algorithm. Our main result is that this algorithm converges for
all tasks that we call reducible. Intuitively, a task is reducible if there exists
a policy that is guaranteed to lead to reward. We also provide a test for con-
vergence that an outside observer could apply to decide when convergence has
happened, which can be used to detect convergence in a simulation. We note
that the final policy is allowed to explore only a strict subset of the entire state
space.
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A first motivation for this work is to understand how biological organisms
can be successful in learning navigational tasks. For example, animals can learn
to navigate from their nest to foraging areas and back again (Geva-Sagiv et al.,
2015). Reward could be related to finding food or returning home. As in stan-
dard RL, the learning process might initially exhibit exploration, after which
eventually a policy is found that leads the animal more reliably to reward. In
the context of biologically plausible learning, Fre´maux et al. (2013) make the
following interesting observations. First, navigational learning is not restricted
to physical worlds, but can also be applied to more abstract state spaces. Sec-
ond, the formed policy strongly depends on the experiences of the agent, and
therefore the policy is not necessarily optimal. We elaborate these observations
in our formal framework. We consider a general definition of tasks, which can
be used to represent both physically-inspired tasks and more abstract tasks.
Furthermore, we do not insist on finding (optimal) policies that generate the
shortest path to reward, but we are satisfied with learning policies that avoid
cycles.
A secondary motivation for this work is to contribute towards filling an ap-
parent gap that exists between the field of Reinforcement Learning and the more
logic-based fields of AI and computer science. Indeed, on the structural level,
the notion of task as used in RL is very similar to the notion of interpretation in
description logics (Baader et al., 2010), or the notion of transition system used
in verification (Baier and Katoen, 2008). Yet, the methods used in RL to estab-
lish convergence are largely based on techniques from numerical mathematics
and the theory of optimization. Our aim was to give proofs of convergence that
are more elementary and are more in the discrete-mathematics style common
in the above logic-based fields, as well as in traditional correctness proofs of
algorithms (Cormen et al., 2009).
Standard RL convergence proofs assume the condition that state-action pairs
are visited (and thus updated) infinitely often, see e.g. (Watkins and Dayan,
1992). Conditions of this kind are known as fairness conditions in the theory of
concurrent processes (Francez, 1986). Also for our convergence proof we need an
appropriate fairness assumption to the effect that when the agent repeats some
policy-updating configuration infinitely often, it must also explore all possible
updates infinitely often.
We note that the cycle-detection learning algorithm could be remotely re-
lated to biologically plausible mechanisms. In some models of biological learn-
ing (Potjans et al., 2011; Fre´maux et al., 2013), a policy is represented by synap-
tic connections from neurons encoding (the perception of) states to neurons
encoding actions. Connections are strengthened when pre-before-post synap-
tic activity is combined with reward (Schultz, 2013), causing an organism to
remember action preferences for encountered states. If an organism would ini-
tially have a policy that frequently leads to cycles in the task, there is a (slow)
way to still unlearn that policy, as follows.1 Consider a pair (q, a) of a state q
and its preferred action a in the policy. Due to noise (Maass, 2014), a neuron
x participating in the encoding of action a could become activated just before
state q effectively occurs. Possibly, this post-before-pre synaptic activity leads
to long-term-depression (Gerstner et al., 2014), i.e., connections from q to x are
1In this discussion, we purposely do not mention mechanisms of disappointment, i.e., the
opposite of reward, because the framework in this article does not contain such mechanisms.
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weakened.2 At some synapses, the weakening effect is aided by a longer time
window for long-term-depression compared to long-term-potentiation (Markram
et al., 2011). So, if reward would remain absent for longer periods, as in cycles
without reward, noise could gradually unlearn action preferences for states. In
absence of such preferences, noise could generate random actions for states. The
unlearning phase followed by new random action proposals, would resemble our
cycle-detection algorithm.
Outline This article is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Sec-
tion 2. We formalize important concepts in Section 3. We present and prove
our results in Section 4. We discuss examples and simulations in Section 5, and
we conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Some previous work on reinforcement learning algorithms is focused on learning
a policy efficiently, say, using a polynomial number of steps in terms of certain in-
put parameters of the task (Kearns and Singh, 2002; Brafman and Tennenholtz,
2002; Strehl et al., 2009). There is also a line of work in reinforcement learning
that is not necessarily aimed towards efficiently bounding the learning time. In
that case, convergence of the learning process happens in the limit, by visit-
ing task states infinitely often. Some notable examples are temporal-difference
learning (Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998) and Q-learning (Watkins, 1989;
Watkins and Dayan, 1992). Temporal-difference learning has become an attrac-
tive foundation for biological learning models (Potjans et al., 2011; Fre´maux
et al., 2013; Schultz, 2013, 2015).
Most previous works in numerical reinforcement learning try to find optimal
policies, and their related optimal value functions (Sutton, 1988; Watkins and
Dayan, 1992; Dayan, 1992; Dayan and Sejnowski, 1994; Jaakkola et al., 1994;
Tsitsiklis, 1994); an optimal policy gives the highest reward in the long run. This
has motivated the design of numerical learning techniques. The corresponding
proof techniques do not always clearly illuminate how properties of the task
state space interplay with a particular learning algorithm. With the framework
introduced in this article, we hope to shed more light on properties of the task
state space, in particular on the way that paths could be formed in the graph
structure of the task. Although our graph-oriented framework has a different
viewpoint compared to standard numerical reinforcement learning, we believe
that our Theorem 4.1, showing that convergence always occurs on reducible
tasks, and its proof contribute to making the fascinating idea of reinforcement
learning more easily accessible to a wider audience. Our convergence result has
a similar intent as previous results showing that numerical learning algorithms
converge with probability one.
Various papers study models of reinforcement learning in the context of
neuronal agents that learn to navigate a physical environment (Vasilaki et al.,
2009; Potjans et al., 2011; Fre´maux et al., 2013). Interestingly, Fre´maux et al.
2 If neuron x is activated by noise just before state q occurs, refractoriness could prevent
state q from subsequently activating x (Gerstner et al., 2014). The resulting absence of a
postsynaptic spike at x fails to elicit long-term-potentiation, i.e., connections from q to x are
not strengthened. So, the mentioned weakening effect is not compensated.
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(2013) study both physical and more abstract state spaces. As an example of a
physical state space, they consider a navigation task in which a simulated mouse
has to swim to a hidden platform where it can rest, where resting corresponds
to reward; each state contains only the x and y coordinate. As an example of
an abstract state space, they consider an acrobatic swinging task where reward
is given when the tip of a double pendulum reaches a certain height; this space
is abstract because each state contains two angles and two angular velocities,
i.e., there are four dimensions. Conceptually it does not matter how many
dimensions a state space has, because the agent is always just seeking paths in
the graph structure of the task.
This idea of finding paths in the task state space is also explored by Bonet
and Geffner (2006), in a framework based on depth-first search. Their framework
has a more global perspective where learning operations have access to multiple
states simultaneously and where the overall search is strongly embedded in
a recursive algorithm with backtracking. Our algorithm acts from the local
perspective of a single agent, where only one state can be observed at any time.
As remarked by Sutton and Barto (1998, p. 104), a repeated theme in re-
inforcement learning is to update the policy (and value estimation) while the
agent visits states. This theme is also strongly present in the current article,
because for each visited state the policy always remembers the lastly tried ac-
tion for that state. The final aim for convergence, as studied in this article, is
to eventually not choose any new actions anymore for the encountered states.
The notion of reducibility discussed in this article is related to the principles
of (numerical) dynamic programming, upon which a large part of reinforcement
learning literature is based (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Indeed, in reducibility,
we defer the responsibility of obtaining reward from a given state to one of
the successor states under a chosen action. This resembles the way in dynamic
programming that reward prediction values for a given state can be estimated
by looking at the reward prediction values of the successor states. In settings
of standard numerical reinforcement learning, dynamic programming finds an
optimal policy in a time that is worst-case polynomial in the number of states
and actions. This time complexity is also applicable to our iterative reducibility
procedure given in Section 3.1.
3 Navigational Reinforcement Learning
We formalize tasks and the notion of reducibility in Section 3.1. Next, in Sec-
tion 3.2, we use an operational semantics to formalize the interaction between
a task and our cycle-detection learning algorithm. In Section 3.3, we define
convergence as the eventual stability of the policy. Lastly, in Section 3.4, we
impose certain fairness restrictions on the operational semantics.
3.1 Tasks and Reducibility
Tasks To formalize tasks, we use nondeterministic transition systems where
some transitions are labeled as being immediately rewarding, where reward is
only an on-off flag. Formally, a task is a five-tuple
T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ)
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where Q, Q0, and A are nonempty finite sets; Q0 ⊆ Q; rewards is a nonempty
subset of Q×A; and, δ is a function that maps each (q, a) ∈ Q×A to a nonempty
subset of Q. The elements of Q, Q0, and A are called respectively states, start
states, and actions. The set rewards tells us which pairs of states and actions
give immediate reward. Function δ describes the possible successor states of
applying actions to states.
Remark 3.1. Our formalization of tasks keeps only the graph structure of mod-
els previously studied in reinforcement learning; essentially, compared to finite
Markov decision processes (Sutton and Barto, 1998), we omit transition prob-
abilities and we simplify the numerical reward signals to boolean flags. We do
not yet study negative feedback signals, so performed actions give either reward
or no reward, i.e., the feedback is either positive or neutral. In our framework,
the agent can observe states in an exact manner, which is a commonly used
assumption (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Kearns and Singh, 2002; Brafman and
Tennenholtz, 2002; Bonet and Geffner, 2006). We mention negative feedback
signals and partial information as topics for further work in Section 6. 
Reducibility Let T be a task as above. We define the set
goals(T ) = {q ∈ Q | ∃a ∈ A with (q, a) ∈ rewards}.
We refer to the elements of goals(T ) as goal states. Intuitively, for a goal state
there is an action that reliably gives immediate reward. Each task has at least
one goal state because the set rewards is always nonempty. The agent could
learn a strategy to reduce all encountered states to goal states, and then perform
a rewarding action at goal states. This intuition is formalized next.
Let V ⊆ Q. We formalize how states can be reduced to V . Let N0 denote
the set of natural numbers without zero. First, we define the infinite sequence
L1, L2, . . .
of sets where L1 = V , and for each i ≥ 2,
Li = Li−1 ∪ {q ∈ Q | ∃a ∈ A with δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1}.
We call L1, L2, etc, the (reducibility) layers. We define reduce(T, V ) =
⋃
i∈N0 Li.
Note that reduce(T, V ) ⊆ Q. Because Q is finite, there is an index n ∈ N0 for
which Ln = Ln+1, i.e., Ln is a fixpoint. Letting V
′ ⊆ Q, we say that V ′ is
reducible to V if V ′ ⊆ reduce(T, V ). Intuitively, each state in V ′ can choose an
action to come closer to V . We also say that a single state q ∈ Q is reducible to
V if q ∈ reduce(T, V ).
Now, we say that task T is reducible (to reward) if the state set Q is reducible
to goals(T ). We use the abbreviation reduce(T ) = reduce(T, V ) where V =
goals(T ). Reducibility formalizes a sense of solvability of tasks.
We illustrate the notion of reducibility with the following example.
Example 3.2. We consider the task T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) defined as fol-
lows: Q = {1, 2, 3}; Q0 = {1}; A = {a, b}; rewards = {(3, a), (3, b)}; and,
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1 a
b
a
2
b
3 a, b
Figure 3.1: The task from Example 3.2. States and action applications are
represented by circles and boxes respectively. Start states are indicated by an
arrow without origin. Goal states and their rewarding actions are highlighted
by a double circle and double box, respectively.
regarding δ, we define
δ(1, a) = {1, 3},
δ(1, b) = {2},
δ(2, a) = {1, 3},
δ(2, b) = {3},
δ(3, a) = δ(3, b) = {3}.
Task T is visualized in Figure 3.1. Note that the task is reducible, by assigning
the action b to both state 1 and state 2. The reducibility layers up to and
including the fixpoint, are:
L1 = goals(T ) = {3},
L2 = {3, 2},
L3 = {3, 2, 1}.
For simplicity, the assignments 1 7→ b and 2 7→ b form a deterministic strat-
egy to reward. But we could easily extend task T to a task in which the strategy
to reward is always subjected to nondeterminism, by adding a new state 4 with
the new mappings δ(1, b) = {2, 4}, δ(4, a) = δ(4, b) = {3}. 
Remark 3.3. Reducibility formalizes the intuition of an acyclic solution. This
appears to be a natural notion of solvability, even in state graphs that contain
cycles (Bonet and Geffner, 2006).
We would like to emphasize that reducibility is a notion of progress in the
task transition graph, but it is not the same as determinism because each action
application, i.e., transition, remains inherently nondeterministic. We may think
of reducibility as onion layers in the state space: the core of the onion consists
of the goal states, where immediate reward may be obtained, and, for states
in outer layers there is an action that leads one step down to an inner layer,
closer to reward. When traveling from an outer layer to an inner layer, the
nondeterminism manifests itself as unpredictability on the exact state that is
reached in the inner layer. 
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3.2 Cycle-detection Algorithm
We describe a cycle-detection learning algorithm that operates on tasks, by
means of an operational semantics that describes the steps taken over time.
We first give the intuition behind the cycle-detection algorithm, and then we
proceed with the formal semantics.
3.2.1 Intuition
We want to formally elaborate the intuition of path learning. Our aim therefore
is not necessarily to design another efficient learning algorithm. It seems in-
formative to seek only the bare ingredients necessary for navigational learning.
How would such a simple algorithm look like?
As a first candidate, let us consider the algorithm that is given some random
initial policy and that always follows the policy during execution. There would
not be any exploration, and no learning, since the policy is always followed and
never modified. In general, the policy might not even lead to any reward at all,
and the agent might run around in cycles without obtaining reward.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there could be a completely random
process, that upon each visit to a task state always chooses some random action.
If the agent is lucky then the random movement through the state space might
occasionally, but unreliably, lead to reward. There is no sign of learning here
either, because there is no storage of previously gained knowledge about where
reward can be obtained.
Now we consider the following in-between strategy: the algorithm could only
choose random actions when it detects a cycle in the state space before reaching
reward. If the agent does not escape from the cycle then it might keep running
around indefinitely without ever reaching reward. More concretely, we could
consider a cycle-detection algorithm, constituted by the following directives:
• Starting from a given start state, we continuously remember all encoun-
tered states. Each time when reward is obtained, we again forget about
which states we have seen.
• Whenever we encounter a state q that we have already seen before, we
perform some random action, and we store that action in the policy (for
that state q).
The cycle-detection algorithm is arguably amongst the simplest learning algo-
rithms that one could conceive. The algorithm might be able to gradually refine
the policy to avoid cycles, causing the agent to eventually follow an acceptable
path to reward. The working memory is a set containing all states that are
visited before obtaining reward. The working memory is reset whenever reward
is obtained.
3.2.2 Operational Semantics
We now formalize the cycle-detection algorithm. In the following, let T =
(Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) be a task.
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Configurations A configuration of T is a triple c = (q, pi, w), where q ∈ Q;
pi maps each q ∈ Q to an element of A; and w ⊆ Q. The function pi is called
the policy. The set w is called the working memory and it contains the states
that are already visited during the execution, but we will reset w to ∅ whenever
reward is obtained. We refer to q as the current state in the configuration, and
we also say that c contains the state q. Note that there are only a finite number
of possible configurations. The aim of the learning algorithm is to refine the
policy during trials, as we formalize below.
Transitions We formalize how to go from one configuration to another, to
represent the steps of the running algorithm. Let c = (q, pi, w) be a configu-
ration. We say that c is branching if q ∈ w; this means that configuration c
represents a revisit to state q, and that we want to generate a new action for
the current state q. Next, we define the set opt(c) as follows: letting A′ = A if
c is branching and A′ = {pi(q)} otherwise, we define
opt(c) = {(a, q′) | a ∈ A′ and q′ ∈ δ(q, a)}.
Intuitively, opt(c) contains the options of actions and successor states that may
be chosen directly after c. If c is branching then all actions may be chosen, and
otherwise we must restrict attention to the action stored in the policy for the
current state. Note that the successor state depends on the chosen action.
Next, for a configuration c1 = (q1, pi1, w1) and a pair (a, q
′) ∈ opt(c1), we
define the successor configuration c2 = (q2, pi2, w2) that results from the appli-
cation of (a, q′) to c1, as follows:
• q2 = q′;
• pi2(q1) = a and pi2(r) = pi1(r) for all r ∈ Q \ {q1}; and,
• w2 = w1 ∪ {q1}.
We emphasize that only the action and visited-status of the state q1 is mod-
ified, where q1 is the state that is departed from. We denote the successor
configuration as apply(c1, a, q
′).
A transition t is a four-tuple (c1, a, q
′, c2), also denoted as c1
a, q′−−→ c2, where
c1 = (q1, pi1, w1) and c2 = (q2, pi2, w2) are two configurations, (a, q
′) ∈ opt(c1),
and c2 = apply(c1, a, q
′). We refer to c1 and c2 as the source configuration
and target configuration, respectively. We say that t is a reward transition if
(q1, a) ∈ rewards. Note that there are only a finite number of possible transitions
because there are only a finite number of possible configurations.
Trials and Runs A chain C is a sequence of transitions where for each pair
(t1, t2) of subsequent transitions, the target configuration of t1 is the source
configuration of t2. Chains could be finite or infinite.
A trial is a chain C where either (i) the chain is infinite and contains no
reward transitions; or, (ii) the chain is finite, ends with a reward transition,
and contains no other reward transitions. To rephrase, if a trial is finite then it
ends at the first occurrence of reward; and, if there is no reward transition than
the trial must be infinite.
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In a trial, we say that an occurrence of a configuration is terminal if that
occurrence is the last configuration of the trial, i.e., the occurrence is the target
configuration of the only reward transition. Note that an infinite trial contains
no terminal configurations.
A start configuration is any configuration c = (q, pi, w) where q ∈ Q0 and
w = ∅; no constraints are imposed on the policy pi.
Now, a run R on the task T is a sequence of trials, where
1. the run is either an infinite sequence of finite trials, or the run consists of
a finite prefix of finite trials followed by one infinite trial;
2. the first configuration of the first trial is a start configuration;
3. whenever one (finite) trial ends with a configuration c1 = (q1, pi1, w1) and
the next trial starts with a configuration c2 = (q2, pi2, w2), we have (i)
q2 ∈ Q0; (ii) pi2 = pi1; and, (iii) w2 = ∅;3 and,
4. if the run contains infinitely many trials then each state q ∈ Q0 is used at
the beginning of infinitely many trials.
We put condition (3) in words: when one trial ends, we start the next trial with
a start state, we reuse the policy, and we again reset the working memory. By
resetting the working memory, we forget which states were visited before ob-
taining the reward. The policy is the essential product of a trial. Condition (4),
saying that each start state is used at the beginning of infinitely many trials,
expresses that we want to learn the whole task, with all possible start states.
To refer to a precise occurrence of a trial in a run, we use the ordinal of that
occurrence, which is a nonzero natural number.
Remark 3.4. In the above operational semantics, the agent repeatedly navi-
gates from start states to goal states. After obtaining immediate reward at a
goal state, the agent’s location is always reset to a start state. One may call such
a framework episodic (Sutton and Barto, 1998). We note that our framework
can also be used to study more continuing operational processes, that do not
always enforce a strong reset mechanism from goal states back to remote start
states. Indeed, a task could define the set of start states simply as the set of all
states. In that case, there are runs possible where some trials start at the last
state reached by the previous trial, as if the agent is trying to obtain a sequence
of rewards; but we still reset the working memory each time when we begin a
new trial. 
3.3 Convergence
We now define a convergence property to formalize when learning has stopped
in a run. Consider a task T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ). Let R be a run on T .
Definition 3.5. We say that a state q ∈ Q (eventually) becomes stable in R if
there are only finitely many non-terminal occurrences of branching configura-
tions containing q.
3Note that c2 satisfies the definition of start configuration.
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An equivalent definition is to say that after a while there are no more branch-
ing configurations at non-terminal positions containing q. Intuitively, eventual
stability of q means that after a while there is no risk anymore that q is paired
with new actions, so q will definitely stay connected to the same action.4 Note
that states appearing only a finite number of times in R always become stable
under this definition.
We say that the run R converges if (i) all trials terminate (with reward),
and (ii) eventually all states become stable. We say that the task T is learnable
if all runs on T converge.
Remark 3.6. In a run that converges, note that the policy will eventually
become fixed because the only way to change the policy is through branching
configurations at non-terminal positions. The lastly formed policy in a run is
called the final policy, which is studied in more detail in Section 4.2. We empha-
size that a converging run never stops, because runs are defined as being infinite;
the final policy remains in use indefinitely, but it is not updated anymore.
We would also like to emphasize that in a converging run, eventually, the
trials contain no cycles before reaching reward: the only moment in a trial
where a state could be revisited, is in the terminal configuration, i.e., in the
target configuration of the reward transition. 
3.4 Fairness
There are two choice points in each transition of the operational semantics:
• if the source configuration of the transition is branching, i.e., the current
state is revisited, then we choose a new random action for the current
state; and,
• whenever we apply an action a to a state q, we can in general choose
among several possible successor states in δ(q, a).
Fairness assumptions are needed to give the learning algorithm sufficient oppor-
tunities to detect problems and try better policies (Francez, 1986). Intuitively,
in both choice points, the choice should be independent of what the policy and
working memory say about states other than the current state. This intuition is
related to the Markov assumption, or independence of path assumption (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Below, we formalize this intuition as a fairness notion for the
operational semantics of Section 3.2.2.
We say that a run R is fair if for each configuration c that occurs infinitely
often at non-terminal positions, for each (a, q′) ∈ opt(c), the following transition
occurs infinitely often:
c
a, q′−−→ apply(c, a, q′).
We say that a task T is learnable under fairness if all fair runs of T converge.
Remark 3.7. There is always a fair run for any task, as follows. For each
possible configuration c, we could conceptually order the set opt(c). During a
run, we could also keep track for each occurrence i ∈ N0 of a configuration c
4If a branching configuration c is terminal in a trial, c can not influence the action of its
contained state because there is no subsequent transition anymore.
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how many times we have already seen configuration c in the run, excluding the
current occurrence; we denote this number as count(i).
We begin the first trial with a random start configuration c1, i.e., we choose
a random start state and a random policy. We next choose the option (a1, q2) ∈
opt(c1) with the first ordinal in the now ordered set opt(c1). Now, for all the
subsequent occurrences i of a configuration c in the run, we choose the option
with ordinal j = (count(i) mod |opt(c)|) + 1 in the set opt(c). So, if a con-
figuration occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions then we continually
rotate through all its options. Naturally, trials end at the first occurrence of
reward, and then we choose another start state; taking care to use all start
states infinitely often. 
4 Results
The cycle-detection learning algorithm formalized in Section 3.2.2 continually
marks the encountered states as visited. At the end of trials, i.e., after obtaining
reward, each state is again marked as unvisited. If the algorithm encounters a
state q that is already visited within the same trial, the algorithm proposes to
generate a new action for q. Intuitively, if the same state q is encountered in the
same trial, the agent might be running around in cycles and some new action
should be tried for q to escape from the cycle. It is important to avoid cycles
if we want to achieve an eventual upper bound on the length of a trial, i.e., an
upper bound on the time it takes to reach reward from a given start state.
Repeatedly trying a new action for revisited states might eventually lead
to reward, and thereby terminate the trial. In this learning process, the non-
determinism of the task can be both helpful and hindering: nondeterminism
is helpful if transitions choose successor states that are closer to reward, but
nondeterminism is hindering if transitions choose successor states that are fur-
ther from reward or might lead to a cycle. Still, on some suitable tasks, like
reducible tasks, the actions that are randomly tried upon revisits might even-
tually globally form a policy that will never get trapped in a cycle ever again
(see Theorem 4.1 below).
The outline of this section is as follows. In Section 4.1, we present a sufficient
condition for tasks to be learnable under fairness. In Section 4.2 we discuss how a
simulator could detect that convergence has occurred in a fair run. In Section 4.3
we present necessary conditions for tasks to be learnable under fairness.
4.1 Sufficient Condition for Convergence
Intuitively, if a task is reducible then we might be able to obtain a policy that
on each start state leads to reward without revisiting states in the same trial.
As long as revisits occur, we keep searching for the acyclic flow of states that
is implied by reducibility. We can imagine that states near the goal states, i.e.,
near immediate reward, tend to more quickly settle on an action that leads to
reward. Subsequently, states that are farther removed from immediate reward
can be reduced to states near goal states, and this growth process propagates
through the entire state space. This intuition is confirmed by the following
convergence result:
Theorem 4.1. All reducible tasks are learnable under fairness.
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Proof. Let T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) be a reducible task. Let R be a fair run
on T . We show convergence of R. In Part 1 of the proof, we show that all trials
in R terminate (with reward). In Part 2, we show that eventually all states
become stable in R.
Part 1: Trials terminate. Let
L1, L2, . . .
be the reducibility layers for T as defined in Section 3.1, where L1 = goals(T ).
Let C be a trial in R. To show finiteness of C, and thus termination of C,
we show by induction on i = 1, 2, . . . that the states in Li occur only finitely
many times in C. Because T is reducible, there is an index n ∈ N0 for which
Ln = Ln+1 = Q, and therefore our inductive proof shows that every state only
occurs a finite number of times in the trial C; hence, C is finite.
Before we continue, we recall that a state q is marked as visited after its first
occurrence in the trial; any occurrence of q after its first occurrence is therefore
in a branching configuration.
Base case. Let q ∈ L1 = goals(T ). Towards a contradiction, suppose
q occurs infinitely often in trial C, making C infinite. Because there are only a
finite number of possible configurations, there is a configuration c containing q
that occurs infinitely often in C at non-terminal positions (because the trial is
now infinite). Configuration c is branching because it occurs more than once.5
By definition of q ∈ goals(T ), there is an action a ∈ A such that (q, a) ∈ rewards.
Since always δ(q, a) 6= ∅, we can choose some q′ ∈ δ(q, a). We have (a, q′) ∈
opt(c) because c is branching. By fairness, the following transition must occur
infinitely often in the trial:
c
a, q′−−→ apply(c, a, q′).
But this transition is a reward transition, so the trial would have already ended
at the first occurrence of this transition. Hence q can not occur infinitely many
times; this is the desired contradiction.
Inductive step. Let i ≥ 2, and let us assume that states in Li−1 occur
only finitely many times in C. Let q ∈ Li \ Li−1. By definition of Li, there is
some action a ∈ A such that δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1. Towards a contradiction, suppose
q occurs infinitely often in C, making C infinite. Like in the base case, there
must be a branching configuration c containing q that occurs infinitely often in
the trial (at non-terminal positions). Since always δ(q, a) 6= ∅, we can choose
some q′ ∈ δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1. We have (a, q′) ∈ opt(c) because c is branching. By
fairness, the following transition must occur infinitely often in the trial:
c
a, q′−−→ apply(c, a, q′).
But then q′ would appear infinitely often in trial C. This is the desired contra-
diction, because the induction hypothesis says that all states in Li−1 (including
q′) occur only finitely many times in C.
5To see this, take for instance the second occurrence of c in the trial. That occurrence
represents a revisit to q, so q is in the working memory set of c.
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Part 2: Stability of states. We now show that all states eventually become
stable in the fair R. Let
L1, L2, . . .
again be the reducibility layers for T as above, where L1 = goals(T ). We show
by induction on i = 1, 2, . . . that states in Li become stable in R. Since T is
reducible, there is an index n ∈ N0 such that Ln = Ln+1 = Q, so our inductive
proof shows that all states eventually become stable.
Before we continue, we recall that Part 1 of the proof has shown that all
trials are finite. So, whenever we say that a configuration occurs infinitely often
in the run, this means that the configuration occurs in infinitely many trials.
Similarly, if a transition occurs infinitely often in the run, this means that the
transition occurs in infinitely many trials.
Base case. Let q ∈ L1 = goals(T ). Towards a contradiction, suppose
q would not become stable. This means that there are infinitely many non-
terminal occurrences of branching configurations containing q.6 Because there
are only finitely many possible configurations, there must be a branching con-
figuration c containing q that occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions.
By definition of q ∈ goals(T ), there is an action a ∈ A such that (q, a) ∈
rewards. Since always δ(q, a) 6= ∅, we can choose some q′ ∈ δ(q, a). We have
(a, q′) ∈ opt(c) because c is branching. By fairness, the following transition t
must occur infinitely often in the run:
c
a, q′−−→ apply(c, a, q′).
Transition t is a reward transition because (q, a) ∈ rewards. Let j be the index
of a trial containing transition t; this implies that t is the last transition of trial
j. We now show that any non-terminal occurrences of q after trial j must be
in a non-branching configuration. Hence, q becomes stable; this is the desired
contradiction.
Consider the first trial index k after j in which q occurs again at a non-
terminal position. Let configuration c1 = (q1, pi1, w1) with q1 = q be the first
occurrence of q in trial k (which is at a non-terminal position). Note that
pi1(q) = a because (i) trial j ends with the assignment of action a to q (through
transition t), and (ii) the trials between j and k could not have modified the
action of q. Further, configuration c1 is not branching because q is not yet
flagged as visited at its first occurrence in trial k. This means that at any
occurrence of c1, trial k must select an option (a, q
′′) ∈ opt(c1), with action a
and q′′ ∈ δ(q, a), and perform the corresponding transition t′:
c1
a, q′′−−−→ apply(c1, a, q′′).
Again, since (q, a) ∈ rewards, trial k ends directly after transition t′; no branch-
ing configuration containing q can occur in trial k at a non-terminal position.7
This reasoning can now be repeated for all following trials to see that there are
no more non-terminal occurrences of branching configurations containing q.
6For completeness, we recall that if q would occur only a finite number of times in the run
then we can immediately see in the definition of stability that q becomes stable.
7Although it is possible that q is directly revisited from itself, it does not matter whether
the terminal configuration of the trial is branching or not.
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Inductive step. Let i ≥ 2. We assume for each q′ ∈ Li−1 that q′
eventually becomes stable. Now, let q ∈ Li \ Li−1. By definition of Li, there
is an action a ∈ A such that δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1. Towards a contradiction, suppose
that q does not become stable. Our aim is to show that now also at least
one q′ ∈ δ(q, a) does not become stable, which would contradict the induction
hypothesis.
Regarding terminology, we say that a chain is a (q, a)-chain if (i) the chain
contains only non-reward transitions and (ii) the chain has the following desired
form:
c1
a1, q2−−−→ c2 a2, q3−−−→ . . . an−1, qn−−−−−→ cn,
denoting cj = (qj , pij , wj) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where q1 = qn = q and a1 = a.
Note that such a chain starts and ends with an occurrence of q, so q is revisited
in the chain. Moreover, the first transition performs the action a from above.
Next, we say that a trial is a (q, a)-trial if the trial contains a (q, a)-chain. In
principle, each (q, a)-trial could embed a different (q, a)-chain.
To see that there are infinitely many occurrences of (q, a)-trials in R, we
distinguish between the following two cases.
• Suppose that in R there are infinitely many occurrences of trials that end
with a policy pi where pi(q) = a, i.e., action a is assigned to q. Let j be
the index of such a trial occurrence. Because by assumption q does not
become stable, we can consider the first trial index k after j in which q
occurs in a branching configuration at a non-terminal position. Note that
trials between trial j and trial k do not modify the action of q. Now,
the first occurrence of q in trial k is always non-branching, and thus we
perform action a there. The subsequence in trial k starting at the first
occurrence of q and ending at some branching configuration of q at a
non-terminal position, is a (q, a)-chain: the chain starts and ends with
q, its first transition performs action a, and it contains only non-reward
transitions because it ends at a non-terminal position. Hence, trial k is a
(q, a)-trial.
• Conversely, suppose that in R there are only finitely many occurrences of
trials that end with a policy pi where pi(q) = a. Let R′ be an (infinite)
suffix of R in which no trial ends with action a assigned to q. Because by
assumption q does not become stable, and because the number of possible
configurations is finite, there is a branching configuration c containing q
that occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions in R′. Choose some
q′ ∈ δ(q, a). We have (a, q′) ∈ opt(c) because c is branching. By fairness,
the following transition t occurs infinitely often in R′:
c
a, q′−−→ apply(c, a, q′).
Let j be the index of a trial occurrence in R′ that contains transition t;
there are infinitely many such indexes because all trials in R are finite
(see Part 1 of the proof). Since transition t attaches action a to q, we
know by definition of R′ that any occurrence of t in trial j is followed by
at least one other transition from state q that attaches an action b to q
with b 6= a; this implies that after each occurrence of transition t in trial j
there is a branching configuration of q at a non-terminal position. In trial
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j, a subsequence starting at any occurrence of t and ending with the first
subsequent branching configuration of q at a non-terminal position, is a
(q, a)-chain: the chain starts and ends with q, its first transition performs
action a, and the chain contains only non-reward transitions because it
ends at a non-terminal position. Hence, trial j is a (q, a)-trial.
We have seen above that there are infinitely many occurrences of (q, a)-trials
in R. Because there are only a finite number of possible configurations, there
is a configuration c containing q that is used in infinitely many occurrences
of (q, a)-trials as the last configuration of a (q, a)-chain. Note that c occurs
infinitely often at non-terminal positions since (q, a)-chains contain no reward
transitions.
Next, we can choose from some occurrence of a (q, a)-trial in the run some
(q, a)-chain C where in particular the last configuration of C is the configuration
c. Formally, we write C as
c1
a1, q2−−−→ c2 a2, q3−−−→ . . . an−1, qn−−−−−→ cn,
where cn = c, and denoting cj = (qj , pij , wj) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where q1 =
qn = q and a1 = a. We recall that all transitions of C are non-reward transitions.
Note that 2 < n: we have q 6= q2 because q /∈ Li−1 and q2 ∈ δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1.
In chain C, we have certainly marked state q as visited after its first occur-
rence, causing configuration cn to be branching. This implies (a, q2) ∈ opt(cn),
where (a, q2) is the same option as taken by the first transition of C, since a1 = a.
Also, since 2 < n, we have certainly marked state q2 as visited after its first oc-
currence in C; this implies q2 ∈ wn. Next, since the configuration cn = c occurs
infinitely often at non-terminal positions (see above), the following transition
also occurs infinitely often by fairness:
cn
a, q2−−−→ cn+1,
where cn+1 = (qn+1, pin+1, wn+1) = apply(cn, a, q2). Because qn+1 = q2 and
q2 ∈ wn ⊆ wn+1, configuration cn+1 is branching. Moreover, we know that
(q, a) /∈ rewards since no transition of C is a reward transition, including the first
transition. So, the branching configuration cn+1 occurs infinitely often at non-
terminal positions. Hence, q2 would not become stable. Yet, q2 ∈ δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1,
and the induction hypothesis on Li−1 says that q2 does become stable; this is
the desired contradiction. 
Remark 4.2. By Theorem 4.1, the trials in a fair run on a reducible task
eventually contain a number of non-terminal configurations that is at most the
number of states; otherwise at least one state would never become stable.8
So, we get a relatively good eventual upper bound on trial length. However,
Theorem 4.1 provides no information on the waiting time before that upper
bound will emerge, because that waiting time strongly depends on the choices
made by the run regarding start states of trials, tried actions, and successor
states (see also Section 6).
8If there would be infinitely many trials that contain more non-terminal configurations than
states, then in infinitely many trials there is a revisit to a state (in a branching configuration)
on a non-terminal position. Since there are only finitely many states, there would be at least
one state q that in infinitely many trials occurs in a branching configuration on a non-terminal
position; this state q does not become stable by definition.
15
Because we seek a policy that avoids revisits to states in the same trial, an
important intuition implied by Theorem 4.1 is that for reducible tasks eventually
the trials of a run follow paths without cycles through the state space. The
followed paths are still influenced by nondeterminism, but they never contain a
cycle. Also, a path followed in a trial is not necessarily the shortest possible path
to reward, because the discovery of paths depends on experience, i.e., on the
order in which actions were tried during the learning process. The experience
dependence was experimentally observed, e.g. by Fre´maux et al. (2013). 
Remark 4.3. The order in which states become stable in a fair run does not
necessarily have to follow the order of the reducibility layers of Section 3.1. In
general, it seems possible that some states that are farther removed from goal
states could become stable faster than some states nearer to goal states; but,
to become stable, the farther removed states probably should first have some
stable strategy to the goal states.
To see that simulations do not exactly follow the inductive reasoning of the
proof of Theorem 4.1, one could compare, in the later Section 5, the canoni-
cal policy implied by reducibility in Figure 5.2 with an actual final policy in
Figure 5.4. 
The following example illustrates the necessity of the fairness assumption in
Theorem 4.1. So, although the convergence result for reducible tasks appears
natural, the example reveals that subtle notions, like the fairness assumption,
should be taken into account to understand learning.
Example 4.4. Consider again the task T from Example 3.2, that is also vi-
sualized in Figure 3.1. In the following, for ease of notation, we will denote
configurations as triples (x, y, Z), where x is the current state; y is the action
assigned by the policy to the specific state 1, with action a assigned to all other
states; and Z is the set of visited states as before.
Consider now the following trial Ca where the initial policy has assigned
action a to all states, including the start state 1:
(1, a, { }) a,1−−→ (1, a, {1}) b,2−−→ (2, b, {1}) a,3−−→ (3, b, {1, 2}) a,3−−→ (3, b, {1, 2, 3}).
This is indeed a valid trial because the last transition is a reward transition.
Note also that a revisit to state 1 occurs in the first transition. The configuration
(1, a, {1}) is thus branching, which implies that the option (b, 2) may be chosen
there. At the end of trial Ca, action b is assigned to state 1 and action a is
assigned to the other states.
Consider also the following trial Cb where the initial policy has assigned
action b to state 1 and a to all other states:
(1, b, { }) b,2−−→ (2, b, {1}) a,1−−→ (1, b, {1, 2}) a,3−−→ (3, a, {1, 2}) a,3−−→ (3, a, {1, 2, 3}).
The last transition is again a reward transition. Note that a revisit occurs
to state 1 in the second transition. The configuration (1, b, {1, 2}) is therefore
branching, which implies that the option (a, 3) may be chosen there. At the end
of trial Cb, action a is assigned to all states, including state 1.
Now, let R be the run that alternates between trials Ca and Cb and that
starts with trial Ca. The state 1 never becomes stable in R because we assign
action a and action b to state 1 in an alternating fashion. So, run R does not
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converge because there are infinitely many non-terminal occurrences of branch-
ing configurations containing state 1.
Although run R satisfies all requirements of a valid run, R is not fair. For
example, although the configuration (1, b, {1, 2}) occurs infinitely often (due to
repeating trial Cb), this configuration is never extended with the valid option
(b, 2) that could propagate revisits of state 1 to revisits of state 2 in the same
trial; revisits to state 2 could force state 2 to use the other action b, which in
turn could aid state 1 in becoming stable.
In conclusion, because task T is reducible and yet the valid (but unfair)
run R does not converge, we see that Theorem 4.1 does not hold in absence of
fairness. 
4.2 Detecting the Final Policy
We refer to the lastly formed policy of a run as the final policy. For an in-
creased understanding of what convergence means, it appears interesting to say
something about the form of the final policy. In particular, we would like to
understand what kind of paths are generated by the final policy. As an addi-
tional benefit, recognizing the form of the final policy allows us to detect the
convergence point in a simulation.9
We syntactically characterize the final policy in Theorem 4.5. In general,
verifying the syntactical property of the final policy requires access to the entire
set of task states. In this subsection, we do not require that tasks are reducible.
We first introduce the two key parts of the syntactical characterization,
namely, the so-called forward and backward sets of states induced by a policy.
As we will see below, the syntactical property says that the forward set should
be contained in the backward set.
Forward and Backward Let T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) be a task that is
learnable under fairness. To make the notations below easier to read, we omit
the symbol T from them. It will always be clear from the context which task is
meant.
Let pi : Q → A be a policy, i.e., each q ∈ Q is assigned an action from A.
First, we define
ground(pi) = {q ∈ goals(T ) | (q, pi(q)) ∈ rewards};
this is the set of all goal states that are assigned a rewarding action by the
policy. Next, we define two sets forward(pi) ⊆ Q and backward(pi) ⊆ Q, as
follows. For the set forward(pi), we consider the infinite sequence F1, F2, . . . of
sets, where F1 = Q0 and for each i ≥ 2,
Fi = Fi−1 ∪
⋃
q ∈ Fi−1 \ ground(pi)
δ(q, pi(q)).
We define forward(pi) =
⋃
i∈N0 Fi. Note that forward(pi) ⊆ Q. Intuitively, the
set forward(pi) contains all states that are reachable from the start states by
9Precise convergence detection is possible because our framework does not model reward
numerically and thus there are no numerical instability issues near convergence. The conver-
gence detection enables some of the simulation experiments in Section 5.
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following the policy. In the definition of Fi with i ≥ 2, we remove ground(pi)
from the extending states because we only want to add states to forward(pi)
that can occur at non-terminal positions of trials.10
For the set backward(pi), we consider the infinite sequence B1, B2, . . . of
sets, where B1 = ground(pi) and for each i ≥ 2,
Bi = Bi−1 ∪ {q ∈ Q | δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Bi−1}.
We define backward(pi) =
⋃
i∈N0 Bi. Note that backward(pi) ⊆ Q. Intuitively,
backward(pi) is the set of all states that are reduced to the goal states in
ground(pi) by the policy.
For completeness, we remark that the infinite sequences F1, F2, . . . , and B1,
B2, . . . , each have a fixpoint because Q is finite.
Final Policy We formalize the final policy. Let T be a task that is learnable
under fairness. Let R be a fair run on T , which implies that R converges.
We define the convergence-trial of R as the smallest trial index i for which the
following holds: trial i terminates and after trial i there are no more branching
configurations at non-terminal positions.11 This implies that after trial i the
policy can not change anymore, because to change the action assigned to a state
q, the state q would have to occur again in branching configuration at a non-
terminal position. We define the final policy of R to be the policy at the end of
the convergence-trial. In principle, different converging runs can have different
final policies.
Now, we can recognize the final policy with the following property, that
intuitively says that any states reachable by the policy are also safely reduced
by the policy to reward:
Theorem 4.5. Let T be a task that is learnable under fairness.12 Let R be a
converging fair run of T . A policy pi occurring in run R at the end of a trial is
the final policy of R if and only if
forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi).
Proof. We show in two separate parts that forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi) is (i) a
sufficient and (ii) a necessary condition for pi to be the final policy of run R.
Part 1: Sufficient condition. Let pi be a policy occurring in run R at the
end of a trial. Assume that forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi). We show that pi is the
final policy of R.
Concretely, we show that any trial starting with policy pi will (i) use pi in
all its configurations, including the terminal configuration; and, (ii), does not
contain branching configurations at non-terminal positions. This implies that
the first trial ending with pi is the convergence-trial, so pi is the final policy.
Let C be a trial in R that begins with policy pi. We explicitly denote trial C
as the following finite chain of transitions:
c1
a1, q2−−−→ . . . an−1, qn−−−−−→ cn.
10Possibly, some states directly reachable from ground(pi) are still in forward(pi) because
those states are also reachable from states outside ground(pi).
11With this definition of convergence-trial, a run converges if and only if the run contains a
convergence-trial.
12In contrast to Theorem 4.1, we do not require that T is reducible.
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For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we denote ci = (qi, pii, wi). Let F1, F2, . . . be the infinite
sequence of sets previously defined for forward(pi). We show by induction on
i = 1, . . . , n− 1 that
(a) pii = pi;
(b) qi ∈ Fi;
(c) ci is non-branching.
At the end of the induction, we can also see that pin = pi: first, we have pin =
pin−1 because configuration cn−1 is non-branching by property (c);13 second,
pin−1 = pi by property (a).
Base case. Let i = 1. For property (a), we have pi1 = pi because the
trial starts with policy pi. For property (b), we see that q1 ∈ Q0 = F1. For
property (c), we know that c1 is non-branching because the first configuration
in a trial still has an empty working memory of visited states.
Inductive step. Let i ≥ 2, with i ≤ n− 1. Assume that the induction
properties are satisfied for the configurations c1, . . . , ci−1. We now show that
the properties are also satisfied for ci.
Property (a) By applying the induction hypothesis for property (c) to ci−1,
namely that ci−1 is non-branching, we know pii = pii−1. By subsequently
applying the induction hypothesis for property (a) to ci−1, namely pii−1 =
pi, we know pii = pi.
Property (b) To start, we note that qi ∈ δ(qi−1, pii−1(qi−1)) because ci−1
is non-branching by the induction hypothesis for property (c). By subse-
quently applying the induction hypothesis for property (a) to ci−1, namely
pii−1 = pi, we know qi ∈ δ(qi−1, pi(qi−1)). Moreover, since i−1 < i ≤ n−1,
the transition ci−1
ai−1, qi−−−−−→ ci, where ai−1 = pi(qi−1), is a non-reward tran-
sition. Hence, (qi−1, pi(qi−1)) /∈ rewards and thus qi−1 /∈ ground(pi).
Lastly, by applying the induction hypothesis for property (b) to ci−1,
we overall obtain that qi−1 ∈ Fi−1 \ ground(pi). Combined with qi ∈
δ(qi−1, pi(qi−1)), we see that qi ∈ Fi.
Property (c) Towards a contradiction, suppose that configuration ci is branch-
ing. This means that state qi is revisited in ci.
14 Let V = {q1, . . . , qi−1}.
Note that qi ∈ V , which implies V 6= ∅. By applying the induction hy-
pothesis for property (b) to configurations c1, . . . , ci−1, we know that
V ⊆ forward(pi). We now show that V ∩ backward(pi) = ∅, which would
imply forward(pi) 6⊆ backward(pi); this is the desired contradiction.
Let B1, B2, . . . be the infinite sequence of sets defined for backward(pi)
above. We show by induction on j = 1, 2, . . . that V ∩Bj = ∅, which then
overall implies V ∩ backward(pi) = ∅.
13Because configuration cn−1 is non-branching, we have pin(qn−1) = an−1 = pin−1(qn−1),
which, combined with pin(r) = pin−1(r) for each r ∈ Q \ {qn−1}, gives pin = pin−1.
14Recall that, by definition of branching configuration, we have qi ∈ wi.
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• Base case: j = 1. By definition, B1 = ground(pi). Let q ∈ V .
Let k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} be the smallest index for which qk = q, i.e.,
configuration ck represents the first occurrence of q in the trial. By
applying the outer induction hypothesis for properties (a) and (c) to
ck, we know that ak = pik(qk) = pi(q). But since k ≤ i−1 < i ≤ n−1,
we know that transition ck
ak, qk+1−−−−−→ ck+1 is not a reward transition,
implying (q, pi(q)) /∈ rewards. Hence, q /∈ ground(pi), and overall
V ∩ ground(pi) = ∅.
• Inductive step. Let j ≥ 2. Assume V ∩ Bj−1 = ∅. Towards a
contradiction, suppose V ∩ Bj 6= ∅. Take some q ∈ V ∩ Bj . If
q ∈ Bj−1 then we would immediately have a contradiction with the
induction hypothesis. Henceforth, suppose q ∈ Bj \Bj−1, which, by
definition of Bj , means δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Bj−1. We will now show that
V ∩δ(q, pi(q)) 6= ∅, which would give V ∩Bj−1 6= ∅; this is the desired
contradiction.
Since q ∈ V , there is some smallest k ∈ {1, . . . , i−1} such that qk = q.
Using a similar reasoning as in the base case (j = 1), by applying the
outer induction hypothesis for properties (a) and (c) to configuration
ck, we can see that ak = pi(qk). This implies qk+1 ∈ δ(qk, pi(qk)). As
a last step, we show that qk+1 ∈ V , which gives V ∩ δ(qk, pi(qk)) 6= ∅.
We distinguish between the following cases:
– If k ≤ i− 2 then k+ 1 ≤ i− 1, and surely qk+1 ∈ V by definition
of V .
– If k = i − 1 then we know qk+1 = qi ∈ V because configuration
ci revisits state qi (see above).
Part 2: Necessary condition. Let pi be the final policy of R. We show
that forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi). By definition of final policy, pi is the policy at
the end of the convergence-trial, whose trial index we denote as i. By definition
of convergence-trial, after trial i there are no more branching configurations at
non-terminal positions. Note in particular that the policy no longer changes
after trial i.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that forward(pi) 6⊆ backward(pi). Let V =
forward(pi) \ backward(pi). Note that V 6= ∅. We show that there is a state
q ∈ V that occurs at least once in a branching configuration at a non-terminal
position after the convergence-trial i; this would be the desired contradiction.
We provide an outline of the rest of the proof. The reasoning proceeds in
two steps. First, we show for each q ∈ V that δ(q, pi(q)) ∩ V 6= ∅. This means
that if we are inside set V , we have the option to stay longer inside V if we
follow the policy pi. Now, the second step of the reasoning is to show that we
can stay arbitrarily long inside V even after the convergence-trial i, causing at
least one state of V to occur in a branching configuration at a non-terminal
position after trial i.
Step 1. Let q ∈ V . We show δ(q, pi(q))∩V 6= ∅. Towards a contradiction,
suppose that δ(q, pi(q)) ∩ V = ∅. Our strategy is to show that δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆
backward(pi), which, by definition of backward(pi), implies that there is some
index j ∈ N0 such that δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Bj . Therefore q ∈ Bj+1 ⊆ backward(pi).
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But that is false because q ∈ V = forward(pi) \ backward(pi); this is the desired
contradiction.
We are left to show that δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ backward(pi). First, we show δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆
forward(pi). By definition, forward(pi) =
⋃
j∈N0 Fj . Since q ∈ V ⊆ forward(pi),
there is some index j ∈ N0 such that q ∈ Fj . Moreover, since q /∈ backward(pi)
and ground(pi) ⊆ backward(pi), we have q /∈ ground(pi). Overall, q ∈ Fj \
ground(pi), which implies that δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Fj+1 ⊆ forward(pi).
Now, we can complete the reasoning by combining δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ forward(pi)
with our assumption δ(q, pi(q)) ∩ V = ∅, to see the following:
δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ forward(pi) \ V
= forward(pi) \ (forward(pi) \ backward(pi))
= forward(pi) ∩ backward(pi)
⊆ backward(pi).
Step 2. We now show that after convergence-trial i there is at least one
occurrence of a branching configuration at a non-terminal position.
We first show that each q ∈ forward(pi) occurs infinitely often at non-
terminal positions after trial i. Recall that forward(pi) =
⋃
j∈N0 Fj . We show by
induction on j = 1, 2, . . . that states in Fj occur infinitely often at non-terminal
positions after trial i.
• Base case: j = 1. By definition, F1 = Q0. Because R is a valid run, each
state of Q0 is used in infinitely many trials as the start state, also after
trial i (see Section 3.2.2).15 Moreover, the first configuration of a trial is
always at a non-terminal position because each trial contains at least one
transition.
• Inductive step. Let j ≥ 2. Assume that each state in Fj−1 occurs infinitely
often at non-terminal positions after trial i. Let q ∈ Fj\Fj−1. This implies
that there is some qj−1 ∈ Fj−1 \ ground(pi) for which q ∈ δ(qj−1, pi(qj−1)).
By applying the induction hypothesis, we know that qj−1 occurs infinitely
often at non-terminal positions after trial i. Because there are only a finite
number of possible configurations, there is a configuration c containing
qj−1 that occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i.
Because trial i is the convergence-trial, we can make two observations
about configuration c: first, c contains the final policy pi because the policy
no longer changes after trial i; and, second, c is non-branching because
no branching configurations occur at non-terminal positions after trial i.
These observations imply (pi(qj−1), q) ∈ opt(c).
Now, since c occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i,
the following transition t occurs infinitely often after trial i by fairness:
c
pi(qj−1), q−−−−−−→ apply(c, pi(qj−1), q).
Lastly, we know that (qj−1, pi(qj−1)) /∈ rewards because qj−1 /∈ ground(pi),
so transition t is a non-reward transition. Therefore state q occurs in-
finitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i.
15We also recall here that R is assumed to converge, which, by definition of convergence,
implies that R is an infinite sequence of finite trials.
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Now take some q1 ∈ V . Since V ⊆ forward(pi), we know from above that q1
occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i. Because there are
only finitely many possible configurations, there is a configuration c1 containing
q1 that occurs infinitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i. After
trial i, the policy no longer changes and only non-branching configurations may
occur at non-terminal positions. So c1 contains the final policy pi and is non-
branching. Moreover, since q1 ∈ V , we know from Step 1 above that there is
some q2 ∈ δ(q1, pi(q1)) ∩ V . Overall, we can see that (pi(q1), q2) ∈ opt(c1). By
fairness, the following transition t1 occurs infinitely often after trial i:
c1
pi(q1), q2−−−−−→ c2,
where c2 = apply(c1, pi(q1), q2). Because q1 ∈ V we have q1 /∈ ground(pi),
so transition t1 is a non-reward transition.
16 Therefore configuration c2 occurs
infinitely often at non-terminal positions after trial i. Denoting c2 = (q2, pi2, w2),
note that q1 ∈ w2.
We now make a similar reasoning for c2 as we did for c1. Since q2 ∈ V , we
know again from Step 1 that there is some q3 ∈ δ(q2, pi(q2)) ∩ V . Configuration
c2 contains the final policy pi because c2 occurs after trial i, and c2 is also non-
branching because it occurs after trial i at a non-terminal position. Therefore
(pi(q2), q3) ∈ opt(c2). Now, since c2 occurs infinitely often at non-terminal
positions after trial i (see above), the following transition occurs infinitely often
after trial i by fairness:
c2
pi(q2), q3−−−−−→ c3,
where c3 = apply(c2, pi(q2), q3). This transition is also non-rewarding because
q2 ∈ V implies q2 /∈ ground(pi). Denoting c3 = (q3, pi3, w3), note that {q1, q2} ⊆
w3. We emphasize that more states of V are now marked as visited.
We can now complete the reasoning. By following the final policy pi from a
state in V , we can always stay inside V without reaching reward. So, the above
procedure can be repeated |V | times in total, to show the existence of a con-
figuration c = (q, pi, w) with q ∈ V that occurs infinitely often at non-terminal
positions after trial i, and where q ∈ w. Configuration c is therefore branching,
and thus the existence of c gives the desired contradiction, as explained at the
beginning of Part 2 of the proof.17 
4.3 Necessary Conditions for Convergence
In Section 4.1, we have seen that reducibility is a sufficient property for tasks
to be learnable under fairness (Theorem 4.1). In this subsection, we also show
necessary properties for tasks to be learnable under fairness. This provides a
first step towards characterizing the tasks that are learnable under fairness.
Thinking about such a characterization is useful because it allows us to better
understand the tasks that are not learnable under fairness.
We first introduce some auxiliary concepts. Let T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ)
be a task. We say that there is a (simple) path from a state q to a state q′ if
16If q1 ∈ ground(pi) then q1 ∈ backward(pi), which is false since q1 ∈ V .
17We note the following for completeness. By repeatedly trying to stay inside V , we are
not guaranteed to see all of V , but we still know that after at most |V | transitions we have
to revisit a state of V at a non-terminal position (after trial i); that first revisit forms the
desired contradiction.
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there is a sequence of actions a1, . . . , an, with possibly n = 0, and a sequence of
states q1, . . . , qn+1 such that
• q1 = q;
• qn+1 = q′;
• qi+1 ∈ δ(qi, ai) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• (qi, ai) /∈ rewards for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; and,
• qi 6= qj for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} with i 6= j.
We emphasize that the path does not contain reward transitions and does not
repeat states. We also denote a path as
q1
a1−→ . . . an−−→ qn+1.
Note that there is always a path from a state to itself, namely, the empty path
where n = 0.
We say that a state q is reachable if there is a path from a start state q0 ∈ Q0
to q. Next, letting V ⊆ Q, we say that a state q has a path to V if there is a path
from q to a state q′ ∈ V . Note that if q has a path to V , it is not guaranteed
that the action sequence of that path always ends in V because the transition
function δ is nondeterministic.
We can now note the following necessary properties for tasks to be learnable
under fairness:
Proposition 4.6. Tasks T that are learnable under fairness satisfy the following
properties:
(a) The reachable states have a path to goals(T ).
(b) The start states are reducible to goals(T ).
The property (a) is related to the assumption that reward can be reached
from every state, see e.g. (Bonet and Geffner, 2006).
Proof. We show the two properties separately. Denote T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ).
Property (a). Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is a reachable
state q that has no path to goals(T ). Note that q /∈ goals(T ) because otherwise
the empty path from q to itself would be a path to goals(T ). Because q is
reachable, there is a path
q1
a1−→ . . . an−−→ qn+1,
where q1 ∈ Q0 and qn+1 = q. We can consider a policy pi where, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we set pi(qi) = ai; the other state-action mappings may be
arbitrary.18 Below we will consider a fair run R whose first trial is given q1 as
start state and pi as the initial policy. First, we consider the following chain C:
c1
a1, q2−−−→ . . . an, qn+1−−−−−→ cn+1,
18Note that there are no conflicting assignments of actions to states because, by definition
of path, each state qi with i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} occurs only once on the path.
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where for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n+1} we define ci = (qi, pi, wi) where wi = {q1, . . . , qi−1}.19
Note that this chain is indeed valid: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, configuration ci
is (constructed to be) non-branching and therefore (pi(qi), qi+1) = (ai, qi+1) ∈
opt(ci); this means that we do not modify the policy during the transition
ci
ai, qi+1−−−−−→ apply(ci, ai, qi+1), but we only mark qi as visited, which gives ci+1 =
apply(ci, ai, qi+1). Note that configuration cn+1 contains the state q.
Consider a fair run R whose first trial starts with the chain C. We show
that the first trial never terminates; this is the desired contradiction because
we had assumed that task T is learnable under fairness. For the first trial to
terminate, the trial must extend chain C to a chain C′ that terminates with a
reward transition. But then the existence of C′ would imply that there is a path
from q to a state q′ ∈ goals(T ), which is false.
Property (b). We show that the start states are reducible to goals(T ). Let R
be a fair run on T , which implies that R converges. Because R converges, there
is a final policy pi, as defined in Section 4.2. Then by Theorem 4.5, we know
that forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi). We have Q0 ⊆ backward(pi) because Q0 ⊆
forward(pi) by definition of forward(pi). Letting reduce(T ) be the set of states
that are reducible to goals(T ), we show below that backward(pi) ⊆ reduce(T );
this implies Q0 ⊆ reduce(T ), as desired.
In Section 3.1, we have defined reduce(T ) =
⋃
i∈N0 Li where L1 = goals(T )
and for each i ≥ 2,
Li = Li−1 ∪ {q ∈ Q | ∃a ∈ A with δ(q, a) ⊆ Li−1}.
Also recall the definition backward(pi) =
⋃
i∈N0 Bi from Section 4.2. We show
by induction on i = 1, 2, . . . that Bi ⊆ Li.
• Base case: i = 1. By definition, B1 = ground(pi) = {q ∈ goals(T ) |
(q, pi(q)) ∈ rewards}. Hence, B1 ⊆ goals(T ) = L1.
• Inductive step. Let i ≥ 2, and let us assume that Bi−1 ⊆ Li−1. Let
q ∈ Bi \ Bi−1, which, by definition of Bi, implies δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Bi−1. By
applying the induction hypothesis, we see δ(q, pi(q)) ⊆ Li−1. This implies
q ∈ Li, and, overall, Bi ⊆ Li.
This completes the proof. 
We recall from Theorem 4.1 that reducibility is a sufficient property for tasks
to be learnable under fairness. Note that reducibility implies the necessary
properties in Proposition 4.6 for tasks to be learnable under fairness. We now
discuss the gap between these sufficient and necessary properties. Let T =
(Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) be a task. Letting reduce(T ) be the set of states that can
be reduced to goals(T ) (as in Section 3.1), we define
unstable(T ) = Q \ reduce(T ).
We call unstable(T ) the unstable set of T . Note that for each state q ∈
unstable(T ), for each action a ∈ A, we always have δ(q, a) ∩ unstable(T ) 6= ∅.20
19In this notation, we interpret {q1, . . . , q0} as ∅.
20Indeed, if δ(q, a) ∩ unstable(T ) = ∅ then δ(q, a) ⊆ reduce(T ) and subsequently q ∈
reduce(T ), which is false.
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1 a 2 a, b
3b a, b
Figure 4.1: The task from Example 4.7, with unstable set {2}. The graphical
notation is explained in Figure 3.1.
So, once we are inside unstable(T ), we can never reliably escape unstable(T ): es-
caping unstable(T ) depends on the nondeterministic choices regarding successor
states. This intuition has also appeared in Part 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.5,
but in that proof we were focusing on just a single fixed action for each state,
as assigned by the final policy at hand.
The following example illustrates how a nonempty unstable set could prevent
convergence. In particular, the example illustrates that the necessary properties
of Proposition 4.6 are not sufficient for a task to be learnable under fairness.
Example 4.7. Consider the task T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) defined as follows:
Q = {1, 2, 3}; Q0 = {1}; A = {a, b}; rewards = {(3, a), (3, b)}; and, regarding δ,
we define
δ(1, a) = {2},
δ(1, b) = {3},
δ(2, a) = δ(2, b) = {2, 3},
δ(3, a) = δ(3, b) = {3}.
The task T is visualized in Figure 4.1. Note that reduce(T ) = {1, 3}, giving
unstable(T ) = {2}.
Note in particular that δ(2, a) ∩ unstable(T ) 6= ∅ and δ(2, b) ∩ unstable(T ) 6= ∅.
Task T satisfies the necessary properties of Proposition 4.6: (i) the reachable
states, which are all states in this case, have a path to goals(T ), and (ii) the
start state 1 is reducible to goals(T ). However, task T is not learnable under
fairness, as we now illustrate. Consider a trial C of the following form: starting
with an initial policy that assigns action a to state 1, we first go from state 1
to state 2; next, we stay at least two consecutive times in state 2; and, lastly,
we proceed to state 3 and obtain reward there. Because there are no revisits to
state 1 in trial C, state 1 remains connected to action a. We now see that we can
make a fair run R by repeating trials of the form of C: state 1 is never revisited
and stays connected to action a, and we keep revisiting state 2. This way, there
are infinitely many branching configurations containing state 2 at non-terminal
positions. So, run R does not converge. 
By looking at Example 4.7, it seems that runs would somehow have to learn
to avoid entering the set unstable(T ). First, we define
border(T ) = {q ∈ reduce(T ) | ∃a ∈ A with δ(q, a) ∩ unstable(T ) 6= ∅}.
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The set border(T ) contains those states that could enter unstable(T ); we call
such states border states. Let q ∈ border(T ), and let V be the subset of
unstable(T ) that is reachable from q. Now, one idea could be to demand for
each q1 ∈ V that there is some (q2, a) ∈ V × A such that q2 ∈ V is reachable
from q1 and q ∈ δ(q2, a), i.e., there is some escape option to return from V back
to border state q. This way, we can revisit that precise border state q in the
same trial, so that under fairness we can choose a new action for q to avoid a
future entrance into unstable(T ). The possibility to revisit border states in the
same trial is exactly what is missing from Example 4.7. The characterization of
tasks that are learnable under fairness might be a class of tasks that satisfy the
necessary properties of Proposition 4.6 and that additionally specify assump-
tions on the transition function to ensure the possibility of revisits to border
states. Illuminating the role of unstable sets in learning is an interesting avenue
for further work (see Section 6).
5 Examples
Theorem 4.1 tells us that all reducible tasks are learnable under fairness, and
Theorem 4.5 allows us to detect when the final policy has been formed. To
illustrate these theorems, we now consider two examples of tasks that are re-
ducible, in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, respectively. Our aim is not to show
practical efficiency of the cycle-detection learning algorithm, but rather to il-
lustrate the theoretical insights. Indeed, because the considered examples are
reducible, they are learnable under fairness by Theorem 4.1. Next, aided by
Theorem 4.5, we can experimentally measure how long it takes for the learning
process to convergence. In Section 6, for further work, we identify aspects where
the learning algorithm could be improved to become more suitable for practice.
5.1 Grid Navigation Tasks
Our first example is a navigation task in a grid world (Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Potjans et al., 2011). In such a task, it is intuitive to imagine how paths are
formed and what they mean. Below we formalize a possible version of such a
grid task.
The grid is represented along two axes, the X- and Y -axis. At any time,
the agent is inside only one grid cell (x, y). We let the state set Q be a subset
of N × N. Let Goals ⊆ Q be a subset of cells, called goal cells. The agent
could apply the following actions to each grid cell: finish, left, right, up, down,
left-up, left-down, right-up, and right-down. Let Agrid denote the set containing
these actions. The finish action is a non-movement action that gives immediate
reward when applied to a goal cell. The finish action intuitively says that the
agent believes it has reached a goal cell and claims to be finished. Activating
the finish action in any non-goal cell will just leave the agent in that cell without
reward. The actions other than finish will be referred to as movement actions.
For every movement action a, there is noise from the environment. We for-
malize this with a noise offset function that maps each movement action to
the possible relative movements that it can cause. For example, offset(left) =
{(−1, 0), (−1,−1), (−1, 1)}, and offset(left-up) = {(−1, 1), (−1, 0), (0, 1)}. In-
tuitively, noise adds one left-rotating option and one right-rotating option to
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Figure 5.1: A grid navigation task. The shaded cells are goal cells, where
the finish action should be executed to obtain reward. Reducibility of cells
is illustrated by the arrows: an arrow leaving a cell represents an action that
the cell could choose to come closer to a goal cell. We note that each arrow
displays only the main intended direction of the action, and that in principle
the noise offsets could occur during execution. In this example, not all cells
are reducible. For the non-reducible cells, for each applied movement action a,
either (i) function δ defines a to stay stationary for the cell, or (ii) a could lead
to another non-reducible cell. Naturally, if all non-reducible cells are removed
then the resulting task is reducible.
the main intended direction. The offsets of the other movement actions can be
similarly defined (see Appendix A). For uniformity we define offset(finish) =
{(0, 0)}.
For a cell (x, y) ∈ N×N and an action a ∈ Agrid we define the set move((x, y), a)
of child-cells that result from the application of the offsets of a to (x, y). For-
mally, we define
move((x, y), a) = {(x+ u, y + v) | (u, v) ∈ offset(a)}.
Now, we say that a task T = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ) is a grid navigation task
if Q ⊆ N×N, Q0 ⊆ Q, A = Agrid, there exists some nonempty subset Goals ⊆ Q
such that
rewards = {(q,finish) | q ∈ Goals},
and for each (q, a) ∈ Q×A we have
δ(q, a) =
{
move(q, a) if move(q, a) ⊆ Q
{q} otherwise.
Note that we only perform a movement action if the set of child-cells is fully
contained in the set of possible grid cells; otherwise the agent remains station-
ary.21
The assumption of reducibility can additionally be imposed on grid naviga-
tion tasks. In Figure 5.1, we visualize a grid navigation task that, for illustrative
purposes, is only partially reducible.
We now discuss two simulation experiments that we have performed on such
grid navigation tasks. Some details of the experiments can be found in Ap-
pendix A. Let N0 denote the set of natural numbers without zero.
21This restriction results in policies that have sufficiently intuitive visualizations; see Fig-
ures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4.
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Convergence-Trial Index Our first experiment measures the convergence-
trial index. First we discuss the general setup of the experiment. We recall from
Section 4.2 that the convergence-trial index of a fair run is the first trial index
where the final policy occurs at the end. For a given task T , we can simulate
fair runs, and we stop each run when the final policy is detected through the
characterization of Theorem 4.5; we remember the convergence-trial index. Each
run is started with a random policy, where each state is assigned a random
action by uniformly sampling the available actions. Fairness depends on the
mechanism for choosing among successor states, which is also based on a uniform
distribution (see Appendix A). Interestingly, we do not have to simulate infinite
runs because we always eventually detect the final policy; when we stop the
simulation after finite time, the finite run may be thought of as a prefix of an
infinite fair run.22
In principle, there is no upper bound on the convergence-trial index in the
simulation. Fortunately, our experiments demonstrate that for the studied re-
ducible tasks, there appears to be a number i ∈ N0 such that the large majority
of simulated runs has a convergence-trial index below i. Possibly, there are
outliers with a very large convergence-trial index, although such outliers are
relatively few in number. We can exclude outliers from a list of numbers by
considering a p-quantile with 0 < p < 1.23
We wanted to see if the convergence-trial index depends on the distance
between the start cells and the goal cells. For this purpose, we have considered
grid tasks with the form of a corridor, as shown in Figure 5.2. There is only one
start cell. The parameter that we can change is the distance from the start cell
to the patch of goal cells. All other aspects remain fixed, including the width
of the corridor and the number and the location of the goal cells. The arrows
in Figure 5.2 show reducibility of this kind of task. For a number l ∈ N0, we
define the l-corridor as the corridor navigation task where the distance between
the start cell and the goal cells is equal to l.
Now, for some lengths l, we have simulated runs on the l-corridor. For each
l-corridor separately, we have simulated 400 runs and we have computed the
0.9-quantile for the measured convergence-trial indexes; this gives an empirical
upper bound on the convergence-trial index for the l-corridor. Figure 5.3a shows
the quantiles plotted against the corridor lengths. We observe that longer cor-
ridors require more time to learn. This is probably because at each application
of a movement action to a cell, there could be multiple successor cells due to
nondeterminism. Intuitively, the nondeterminism causes a drift away from any
straight path to the goal cells. The policy has to learn a suitable action for each
of the cells encountered due to drift. So, when the corridor becomes longer,
more cells are encountered due to nondeterminism, and therefore the learning
process takes more time to learn a suitable action for each of the encountered
cells. Figure 5.3a suggests an almost linear relationship between corridor length
and the empirical upper bound on the convergence-trial index based on the 0.9-
quantile. In Section 5.2, we will see another example, where the relationship is
not linear.
22Of course, it is impossible to simulate an infinite run in practice.
23In Appendix A, we give the precise definition of p-quantile that we have used in our
analysis.
28
Figure 5.2: A corridor template for grid navigation tasks. The single start
cell is marked with a black circle. The goal cells are shaded in gray. The
parameterizable part is the horizontal distance between the start cell and the
patch of goal cells. For completeness, the arrows represent a possible policy
that illustrates reducibility of this kind of task. Although not shown, we recall
that the finish action should be executed on the goal cells. The length of the
depicted corridor is 7, which is the distance between the start cell and the patch
of goal cells.
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Figure 5.3: Plots for the corridor grid navigation tasks.
29
ff
f
(a) Forward state set.
f
f
f
f
f
(b) Backward state set.
Figure 5.4: Visualization of the forward state set and backward state set, from
Section 4.2, of the final policy in one simulated run of the corridor navigation
task shown in Figure 5.2. The states belonging to a set are marked with their
action in the final policy; the empty grid cells are not part of the set. Each
arrow shows only the main intended direction of the action; we do not show the
left-rotating noise option and the right-rotating noise option. Goal cells that
are assigned the finish action by the final policy are marked with the “f” sign.
Trial Length For a fixed grid navigation task, we also wanted to test if trial
length decreases as the run progresses. A decreasing trial length would demon-
strate that the learning algorithm is gradually refining the policy to go more
directly to reward from the start states, avoiding cycles in the state space.
For the fixed corridor length of l = 10, we have simulated the first 2000 trials
of 1000 runs; and, for each trial we have measured its length as the number of
transitions. This gives a data matrix where each cell (i, j), with run index i
and trial index j, contains the length of trial j in the simulated run i. For each
trial index we have computed the 0.9-quantile of its length measurements in all
runs. By plotting the resulting empirical upper bound on trial length against
the trial index, we arrive at Figure 5.3b. We can see that trial length generally
decreases as the run progresses. A similar experimental result is also reported
by Potjans et al. (2011), in the context of neurons learning a grid navigation
task.
Visualizing Forward and Backward We recall from Theorem 4.5 that,
within the context of a specific task, the final policy pi in a converging run
satisfies the inclusion forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi). For the corridor in Figure 5.2,
for one simulated run, we visualize the forward state set and the backward state
set of the final policy in Figure 5.4. Note that the forward state set is indeed
included in the backward state set. Interestingly, in this case, the simulated run
has initially learned to perform the finish action in some goal cells, as witnessed
by the backward state set, but eventually some of those goal cells are no longer
reached from the start state, as witnessed by the forward state set.
5.2 Chain Tasks
In addition to the concrete grid tasks of Section 5.1, we have also considered a
slightly more abstract form of task, that we call chain task. The general form
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1 a1 2 a2 n an n+ 1 ∗
a1
a2
an
Figure 5.5: Template for chain tasks. Regarding notation, the symbol ∗ denotes
the set of all actions {a1, . . . , an}, and the symbol ai with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} stands
for the set of all actions except action ai. The graphical notation of tasks is
explained in Figure 3.1.
of a chain task is shown in Figure 5.5. The parameter n tells us how long the
chain is; the states of the chain are, in order, 1, . . . , n and one final state n+ 1.
To obtain reward from the start state, we should in the worst case perform
all actions a1, . . . , an, in sequence, finished by one arbitrary action. For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the action ai should be applied to state i. But there is forward
nondeterminism that, for each pair (i, ai) could send us to an arbitrary state
later in the chain, closer to state n+ 1. Also, there are backward deterministic
transitions that take us back to the start state whenever we apply the wrong
action to a state. Formally, for a fixed value of n ∈ N0, we obtain a graph
Tn = (Q,Q0, A, rewards, δ), defined as follows: Q = {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}, Q0 = {1},
A = {a1, . . . , an}, rewards = {(n+ 1, a) | a ∈ A}, and regarding δ, we define
• for each i ∈ Q,
δ(i, ai) = {i+ 1, . . . , n+ 1},
δ(i, b) = {1} for each b ∈ A \ {ai}; and,
• for the goal state n+ 1, we define δ(n+ 1, a) = {n+ 1} for each a ∈ A.
Note that for each n ∈ N0, the task Tn is reducible: conceptually, the reducibility
iterations first assign action an to state n, then action an−1 to state n− 1, and
so on, until state 1 is assigned action a1.
On chain tasks, we have performed simulation experiments that are similar to
the experiments on the grid navigation tasks in Section 5.1. These experiments
are discussed next.
Convergence-trial Index Using the same experimental procedure as for grid
tasks, we have simulated runs for some chain lengths. For each chain length
separately, we have simulated 400 runs, and we have computed the 0.9-quantile
of the measured convergence-trial indexes. By plotting the resulting empirical
upper bound on the convergence-trial index against the chain length, we arrive
at Figure 5.6a. We see that the convergence-trial index rises faster than linear
in terms of the chain length; this is in contrast to Figure 5.3a for grid corridors.
One possible explanation, is that the forward nondeterminism on the chain
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causes each state to be visited less frequently in a simulated run. For a fixed
length n, the effect is that a state q ∈ {2, . . . , n} could stay connected longer
to a bad action, leading back to the start state 1. Of course, at the end of
each trial, the start state should be connected to action a1, because otherwise
no progress could have been made; but the other states could in principle have
any action. So, we might not yet encounter the final policy for a long time, as
recognizable through the syntactic characterization of Theorem 4.5.
Trial Length Using the same experimental procedure as for grid tasks, for
the fixed chain length of n = 10, we have simulated the first 2000 trials of 1000
runs, and we have computed the 0.9-quantile on trial length as explained for the
grid corridor experiment. By plotting the resulting empirical upper bound on
trial length against the trial index, we arrive at Figure 5.6b. Again, this figure
suggests that the learning algorithm is able to gradually improve the policy over
trials.
Form of the Final Policy We describe the form of the final policy, rather
than visualizing it, because the form is very restricted. Consider the final policy
pi in a simulated run of the chain task with length n ∈ N0. In the simulation,
we know that each trial should have ended with action a1 assigned to state 1
because otherwise the state n + 1 could not have been reached. This property
also applies to the convergence-trial, so pi(1) = a1. Hence, forward(pi) is the set
of all states due to the forward nondeterminism along the chain. We recall from
Theorem 4.5 that the final policy satisfies forward(pi) ⊆ backward(pi). Therefore,
backward(pi) is also the set of all states. We can now see that the final policy
pi has to satisfy pi(i) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Towards a contradiction, let
i be the largest state number for which pi(i) 6= ai. Then, using the iterations
for computing backward(pi), we can see that {i + 1, . . . , n + 1} ⊆ backward(pi)
but {1, . . . , i} ∩ backward(pi) = ∅.24 This would be the desired contradiction,
because backward(pi) is the set of all states.
6 Conclusion and Further Work
We have studied the fascinating idea of reinforcement learning in a non-numeric
framework, where the focus lies on the interaction between the graph structure
of the task and a learning algorithm. We have studied the graph property of
reducibility, that implies the existence of a policy that makes steady progress
towards reward despite nondeterminism in the task. Interestingly, reducibil-
ity, combined with a natural fairness assumption, enables our simple learning
algorithm to learn the task. We have also characterized the final policy for
converging runs, which allows the precise detection of the convergence-trial in
simulations. We now discuss some avenues for further work.
Characterizing Learnable Tasks We have seen a sufficient property (The-
orem 4.1) and necessary properties (Proposition 4.6) for tasks to be learnable
under fairness. The gap between the sufficient and necessary properties seems
strongly related to the unstable set of a task (see Section 4.3). Perhaps it is
24Here, the computation of backward(pi) is started with the set ground(pi) = {n+ 1}.
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Figure 5.6: Plots for the chain tasks.
possible to characterize the tasks that are learnable under fairness by imposing
some additional constraints on the manner by which the unstable set is con-
nected to the reducible states, in addition to the already identified necessary
properties.
Time Before Convergence Related to Remark 4.2 and to the simulations
in Section 5, one could try to theoretically provide an upper bound on the
convergence-trial index, for some class of tasks. We could also make assumptions
regarding the probability distributions underlying the random actions proposed
for a state and the choice of successor states when applying an action. For a
given task, the result could be a probability distribution on the convergence-trial
index, or on the total number of transitions before convergence.
Fading Eligibility Traces In some models of biologically plausible learning,
the activation between any pair of connected neurons is represented by an el-
igibility trace (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Fre´maux et al., 2013; Gerstner et al.,
2014). When obtaining reward, the value of this trace is applied to the synaptic
weight between the neurons. In realistic scenarios, the traces fade, with the ad-
vantage that a simulation or practical setup does not have to keep remembering
all the information of past states before obtaining reward. The current article
may be viewed as studying eligibility traces that are non-fading, because the
working memory of the cycle-detection learning algorithm is effectively stored
until the end of the trial. It appears interesting to let the working memory fade,
perhaps by modeling the working memory as a first-in-first-out queue, where a
newly entering state would remove the oldest state from the queue once a size
limit has been reached.
Negative Feedback In this article, any path through the state space from a
given start state to reward is good. However, in some applications we want to
avoid certain states. For example, in a navigation task, an organism might want
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to reach its nest from a certain starting location, but on the way to the nest
the organism should avoid hazardous locations like pits or swamps. It appears
interesting to formally investigate such cases. Information about hazards could
be incorporated by extending the framework of this article with an explicit
set hazards in tasks, which contains the state-action pairs which should be
avoided; this is the opposite of the set rewards. The framework could further be
extended to differentiate between trials that terminate with reward and trials
that terminate with a hazard. A run could be said to convergence if eventually
all trials terminate with reward, and all states eventually become stable.
Incomplete Information and Generalization The framework studied in
this article provides complete information to the learning algorithm because
each individual state can be mapped to its own action. In real-world applica-
tions, such as robot navigation (Thrun et al., 2005), the agent can only work
with limited sensory information available in each time step. In that case, the
agent should first build concepts for states in order to differentiate them. These
concepts should be made by remembering sensory information over time, and
in general multiple states will remain grouped together under the same concept
because sensory information is not sufficiently accurate to differentiate between
all states. This issue was also raised as an item for future work by Fre´maux
et al. (2013), who initially also have considered a framework in which complete
information is available to the learning agent. There is ongoing work on par-
tially observable tasks, see e.g. (Littman et al., 1995; Chatterjee and Chmel´ık,
2015).
Building concepts is related to the problem of generalization (Sutton and
Barto, 1998) because in real-world tasks there might be too many states to
store in the policy. It would be useful to collect states in conceptual groups and
then assign an action to each group.
It appears interesting to formalize incomplete information and generalization
in an extended version of the current framework, and to investigate sufficient
and necessary properties for convergence.
References
Baader, F., Calvanese, D., McGuinness, D., Nardi, D., and Patel-Schneider, P.,
editors (2010). The Description Logic Handbook, Second Edition: Theory,
Implementation and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
Baier, C. and Katoen, J. (2008). Principles of Model Checking (Representation
and Mind Series). The MIT Press.
Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2006). Learning depth-first search: A unified ap-
proach to heuristic search in deterministic and non-deterministic settings,
and its application to MDPs. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International
Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling, pages 142–151.
Brafman, R. and Tennenholtz, M. (2002). R-MAX - A general polynomial
time algorithm for near-optimal reinforcement learning. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 3:213–231.
34
Chatterjee, K. and Chmel´ık, M. (2015). POMDPs under probabilistic semantics.
Artificial Intelligence, 221:46 – 72.
Cormen, T., Leiserson, C., Rivest, R., and Stein, C. (2009). Introduction to
Algorithms, Third Edition. The MIT Press.
Dayan, P. (1992). The convergence of TD(λ) for general λ. Machine Learning,
8(3–4):341–362.
Dayan, P. and Sejnowski, T. (1994). TD(λ) converges with probability 1. Ma-
chine Learning, 14(3):295–301.
Francez, N. (1986). Fairness. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Fre´maux, N., Sprekeler, H., and Gerstner, W. (2013). Reinforcement learning
using a continuous time actor-critic framework with spiking neurons. PLoS
Computational Biology, 9(4):e1003024.
Gerstner, W., Kistler, W., Naud, R., and Paninski, L. (2014). Neuronal Dynam-
ics: From Single Neurons to Networks and Models of Cognition. Cambridge
University Press.
Geva-Sagiv, M., Las, L., Yovel, Y., and Ulanovsky, N. (2015). Spatial cognition
in bats and rats: from sensory acquisition to multiscale maps and navigation.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(4):94–108.
Hyndman, R. and Fan, Y. (1996). Sample quantiles in statistical packages. The
American Statistician, 50(4):361–365.
Jaakkola, T., Jordan, M., and Singh, S. (1994). On the convergence of stochastic
iterative dynamic programming algorithms. Neural Computation, 6(6).
Kearns, M. and Singh, S. (2002). Near-optimal reinforcement learning in poly-
nomial time. Machine Learning, 49(2–3):209–232.
Littman, M., Cassandra, A., and Kaelbling, L. (1995). Learning policies for
partially observable environments: Scaling up. In Proceedings of the Twelfth
International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 362–370.
Maass, W. (2014). Noise as a resource for computation and learning in networks
of spiking neurons. Proceedings of the IEEE, 102(5):860–880.
Markram, H., Gerstner, W., and Sjo¨stro¨m, P. (2011). A history of spike-timing-
dependent plasticity. Frontiers in Synaptic Neuroscience, 3(4).
Potjans, W., Diesmann, M., and Morrison, A. (2011). An imperfect dopaminer-
gic error signal can drive temporal-difference learning. PLoS Computational
Biology, 7(5):e1001133.
Schultz, W. (2013). Updating dopamine reward signals. Current Opinion in
Neurobiology, 23(2):229 – 238.
Schultz, W. (2015). Neuronal reward and decision signals: From theories to
data. Physiological Reviews, 95(3):853–951.
35
Strehl, A., Li, L., and Littman, M. (2009). Reinforcement learning in finite
MDPs: PAC analysis. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 10:2413–
2444.
Sutton, R. (1988). Learning to predict by the methods of temporal differences.
Machine Learning, 3(1):9–44.
Sutton, R. and Barto, A. (1998). Reinforcement Learning, An Introduction. The
MIT Press.
Thrun, S., Burgard, W., and Fox, D. (2005). Probabilistic Robotics. The MIT
Press.
Tsitsiklis, J. (1994). Asynchronous stochastic approximation and Q-learning.
Machine Learning, 16(3):185–202.
Vasilaki, E., Fre´maux, N., Urbanczik, R., Senn, W., and Gerstner, W.
(2009). Spike-based reinforcement learning in continuous state and action
space: When policy gradient methods fail. PLoS Computational Biology,
5(12):e1000586.
Watkins, C. (1989). Learning from delayed rewards. PhD thesis, Cambridge
University.
Watkins, C. and Dayan, P. (1992). Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8(3–4):279–
292.
36
Table A.1: Grid action offsets. For each movement action, we first give the main
intended direction, followed by a left-rotating noise option and a right-rotating
noise option.
Action Possible offsets
finish (0,0)
left (-1,0), (-1,-1), (-1,1)
right (1,0), (1,-1), (1,1)
up (0,1), (-1,1), (1,1)
down (0,-1), (1,-1), (-1,-1)
left-up (-1,1), (-1,0), (0,1)
left-down (-1,-1), (0,-1), (-1,0)
right-up (1,1), (0,1), (1,0)
right-down (1,-1), (1,0), (0,-1)
Appendix
A Examples
This Section contains additional details for the example tasks discussed in Sec-
tion 5.
A.1 Grid Action Offsets
For our formalization of grid tasks, Table A.1 gives the offsets for each action.
A.2 Quantiles
We compute the quantiles with the statistics package R. For completeness, we
recall here the definition of quantiles that we have used in our analysis; this
definition is called Definition 1 by Hyndman and Fan (1996).
Let L be a nonempty list of numbers, possibly containing duplicates. Let
|L| denote the length of L. For an index i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|}, we write L[i] to denote
the number at index i in L. We write order(L) to denote the ordered version
of L, where the numbers are sorted in ascending fashion; we keep duplicates, so
|order(L)| = |L|.
Let p ∈ R with 0 < p < 1. The p-quantile of a nonempty list L of numbers,
denoted Q(p, L) is defined as follows: denoting j = bp · nc where n = |L|,
Q(p, L) =
{
order(L)[j + 1] if p · n− j > 0
order(L)[j] if p · n− j = 0.
Intuitively, using the index j = bp · nc in the ordered list order(L) is a good
attempt at finding a number v such that a fraction p of L is smaller than or
equal to v. The assumptions 0 < p and p < 1 ensure that we only apply valid
indexes in the range {1, . . . , |L|} to the list order(L).
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A.3 Implementation Notes
The simulation was written with Java Development Kit 8. In our experimen-
tal results, we have measured only the number of transitions and the number
trials in runs. Since no wall-clock time was needed, the exact running time
of the simulation in seconds was not measured. During every transition, we
have used a uniform sampling from the possible successor states. Concretely,
given an array of successor states, we have used the function Math.random() to
generate random indexes in this array, as follows: the double precision number
returned by Math.random() can be converted into an integer by multiplying
with the array length and subsequently truncating the resulting number with
the Math.floor() function.
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